

FEATURES OF THE APPOINTMENT, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES OF PRIME MINISTERS, MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE GOVERNMENTAL CABINETS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

The research is dedicated to clarifying the parameters and features of the appointment, responsibilities and roles of prime ministers, ministers and civil servants in the governmental cabinets of parliamentary democracies, including on the example of European countries. This is actualized by the fact that governmental cabinets in parliamentary democracies, regardless of their type, i.e. majority or minority ones, are typically party cabinets, and thus inter-party and intra-party relations significantly determine the characteristics of appointment, responsibilities and roles of governmental cabinets' members and the fact of parties' interest or disinterest in forming and/or supporting governmental cabinets of one type or another. The study is conducted in a comparative manner, in particular by comparing the specifics of the appointment, responsibilities and roles of prime ministers, ministers and civil servants in majority governmental cabinets and minority government cabinets.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, majority governmental cabinet, minority governmental cabinet, prime minister, minister, civil servant, parliamentary democracy.

CHARAKTERYSTYKA POWOŁANIA, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI ORAZ ROLA PREMIERÓWI URZĘDNIKÓW PAŃSTWOWYCH W URZĘDACH RZĄDOWYCH DEMOKRACJI PARLAMENTARNYCH

W artykule omówiono parametry i cechy powoływania, obowiązki i role premierów, ministrów i urzędników państwowych w gabinetach demokracji parlamentarnych, na przykładzie krajów europejskich. Stwierdzono, że gabinety rządowe w demokracjach parlamentarnych, niezależnie od ich typu – większościowego czy mniejszościowego – są typowo partyjne, a zatem stosunki międzypartyjne i wewnątrzpartyjne w istotny sposób determinują warunki powoływania, odpowiedzialność i role gabinetów rządowych. Badanie przeprowadzono w sposób porównawczy, w szczególności porównując nominacje, obowiązki i role premierów, ministrów i urzędników państwowych w urzędach większościowych oraz w urzędach mniejszościowych.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, gabinet rządowy, rząd większościowy, rząd mniejszościowy, premier, minister, urzędnik państwowy, demokracja parlamentarna.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ, ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ ТА РОЛЕЙ ПРЕМ'ЄР-МІНІСТРІВ, МІНІСТРІВ І ДЕРЖАВНИХ СЛУЖБОВЦІВ В УРЯДОВИХ КАБІНЕТАХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ

Статтю присвячено з'ясуванню параметрів й особливостей призначення, відповідальності та ролей прем'єр-міністрів, міністрів і державних службовців в урядових кабінетах парламентських демократій, в тому числі на прикладі країн Європи. Це актуалізовано тим фактом, що урядові кабінети в парламентських демократіях, причому незалежно від типу – більшості чи меншості – типово є партійними, а відтак міжпартійні та внутрішньопартійні взаємини суттєво визначають особливості призначення, відповідальності та ролей членів урядових кабінетів і сам факт зацікавленості чи незацікавленості партій формувати і/або підтримувати урядові кабінети того чи іншого типу. Дослідження здійснено у компаративістській манері, зокрема на підставі порівняння особливостей призначення, відповідальності та ролей прем'єр-міністрів, міністрів і державних службовців в урядових кабінетах більшості та в урядових кабінетах меншості.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, уряд більшості, уряд меншості, прем'єр-міністр, міністр, державний службовець, парламентська демократія.

The governments in parliamentary, particularly European, democracies have traditionally been positioned as partisan. This means that they are formed, supported in parliament and delegated by their ministers mainly by parliamentary parties / factions, which are actually politically responsible for the functioning of such government cabinets, which are usually divided into one-party and coalition governments of the majority and one-party and coalition governments of the minority (of course, with separate subtypes within each type of party government cabinets). Accordingly, the appointment, responsibilities and roles of prime ministers, ministers and civil servants in the various types of government cabinets of European parliamentary democracies are important in this context, mainly in their division into majority government cabinets and minority government cabinets as two defining clusters of the higher executive bodies.

This issue is quite relevant, as its disclosure allows a better understanding of the parameters of political and inter-party relations regarding the formation, functioning and responsibility of government cabinets in European parliamentary democracies, and thus to look more closely at the internal attributes of political process and governance in Europe. It has been revealed in the studies of researchers such as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strøm¹, H. Bäck, M. Debus and P.

¹ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol. 36, s. 619–643; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion”, The Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg (August 15–17, 2002), 33 s.; Strøm K., Parties at the Core of Government, [w:] Dalton R., Wattenberg M., Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002.

Dumont², J. Blondel and M. Cotta³, A. Costa Pinto⁴, W. Gamson⁵, I. Indridason and C. Kam⁶, K. Johansson and J. Tallberg⁷, L. Karvonen⁸, A. King⁹, M. Laver¹⁰, G. Marchildon¹¹, E. O'Malley¹², G. Peters, R. Rhodes and V. Wright¹³, P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones¹⁴, K. Strøm, W. Müller and T. Bergman¹⁵.

In this case, we will try to systematize them, in particular in terms of comparing the specifics of the analyzed processes in different types of government offices, both in theory and on the example of parliamentary democracies.

This is quite important, because despite the prevalence in Europe of both majority and minority governments (the latter of course less), the latter are still relatively separate in the context of assessing the specifics of the appointment and responsibilities, powers and roles of prime ministers, ministers and public officials, employees, although they fall with them, as noted by J. Blondel, in a common general theoretical pattern of understanding these processes, as well as including political and legislative and patronage in general on the example of all party government cabinets. This commonality is manifested in the fact that the relationship between the outlined components can hypothetically manifest itself in various forms within virtually all types of party governments. The fact is that parties of virtually all types of governments nominate candidates for prime ministers and ministers in order to ensure that they carry out certain political processes. In turn, cabinet ministers can appoint or influence the appointment of senior party functionaries of their parties, thus reducing the likelihood and potential of opposition to their political forces. At the same time, political parties are in fact in the framework of various scenarios and types of governments (but most often in the case of minority governments) may not require ministerial and generally government portfolios in exchange for certain political

² Bäck H., Debus M., Dumont P., Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies, *European Journal of Political Research* 2011, vol. 50, nr. 4, s. 441–478.

³ Blondel J., The Links between Appointments, Policy-making and Patronage in Government-supporting Parties Relationships, *Working Paper* 1995, vol. 101, 31 s.; Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government: An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave 1996.

⁴ Costa Pinto A., *Expert and Non-partisan Ministers Contemporary Democracies: European and Latin American Perspectives*, Wyd. University of Lisbon.

⁵ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *American Sociological Review* 1961, vol. 26, nr. 3, s. 373–382.

⁶ Indridason I., Kam C., Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift, *British Journal of Political Science* 2008, vol. 38, nr. 4, s. 621–656.

⁷ Johansson K., Tallberg J., Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change, *West European Politics* 2010, vol. 33, nr. 2, s. 208–236.

⁸ Karvonen L., *The Personalisation of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2010.

⁹ King A., *Chief Executives in Western Europe*, [w:] Budge I., McKay D. (eds.), *Developing Democracy: Comparative research in honour of J.F.P. Blondel*, Wyd. Sage 1994.

¹⁰ Laver M., Divided Parties, Divided Government, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol. 24, nr. 1, s.

¹¹ Marchildon G., Coalition government and collective responsibility, *Public Sector Magazine* 2010, vol. 21, nr. 3, s. 14–18.

¹² O'Malley E., The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey, *International Political Science Review* 2007, vol. 28, nr. 1, s. 7–27.

¹³ Peters G., Rhodes R., Wright V., *Administering the Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries*, Basingstoke 2000.

¹⁴ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets, *American Political Science Review* 2009, vol. 103, nr. 3, s. 496–512.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Democracies Compared, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol. 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

¹⁵ Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

compromises and taking into account their party-ideological advantages and preferences. In general, it is quite obvious that since all types of party (as well as non-party) governments require parliamentary support (in particular about their formation or functioning), then relations between their appointments and patronage of personal composition and programs of government cabinets are built by the proprietary compromise between the government, who wants his political course to perceive, and parties who want and can get affection.

Taking this into account, it is clear that relations between parties and all types of party governments can be determined and actually determined by various features and differences. The first of them concerns political actors that involve the government-forming process. Since some parties (primarily within the minority governments) are more interested in achieving its own political, not officials / power goals, in particular without being members of government offices, they agree to exchange of one type of benefits (in particular political preferences) to another type of benefits (in particular obtaining political or government power). In the opposite situation (most often in the case of majority governments), government parties and government cabinet as such are randomly related, because they combine their political and power benefits. In turn, the second feature / difference are outlined by those who are initiative in interruptions – parties or governments. In the event that government appointments are carried out by the party to achieve it certain political results or to facilitate the distribution of power benefits (most often in the case of majority governments), the initiative focuses precisely in the party. If the government's office affects the government's office or patronage is distributed in order to smooth out certain aspects of government policy (most often in the case of minority governments), then the initiative focuses on the Government Cabinet. Eventually, the third feature / difference are determined by the nature of the interconnections between the parties and governments, and in accordance with the appointments, political process and patronage. Thus, the interconnection between the process of political creation and patronage is based on exchanging¹⁶. After all, the parties that refrain from joining governments and obtaining ministerial / government portfolios (most often in the case of minority governments), often receive certain political preferences. In contrast, some inter-institutional relationships (most often in the case of majority governments) take the form of a "chain", as appointments by parties or governments lead to political decisions and, in the case of nominations by ministerial parties, to patronage¹⁷.

Against this background, the parameters of appointments, responsibilities and powers in the context of minority governments are extremely specific, as in this case the communication schemes that regulate them are also specific, in particular regarding the construction of government offices under the scheme of their political support, but without their participation.

¹⁶ Cox G., *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

¹⁷ Amorim Neto O., Ström K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol. 36, s. 619–643.; Ström K., Müller W., Bergman T., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

The fact is that at the stage of formation and functioning of minority governments, it is more about the relationship between the parties involved in the process of supporting governments, rather than the relationship between parties and governments. This is due to the fact that the decision to participate or not to participate in (rather than form) minority governments is made before minority governments are formed, and in fact these decisions act only as “safeguards” for the formation of such types of governments. Instead, only after minority governments have been formed can there be a separate inter-institutional relationship between them and the parties, as minority governments may periodically or situationally agree with parties that provide them with parliamentary support, certain prerogatives for such support to remain stable. Accordingly, support for governments (both minority and majority) without their participation occurs mainly in extreme cases, as parties usually expect and try to maximize their power (in office) and political (in programs). This means that parties of virtually any type of party government cabinet - majority and minority – face at least two rational prospects – to refrain from membership in the government cabinet and try to advance their own political goals or gain power and try to advance their political goals¹⁸. At the same time, unlike majority governments, according to K. Strøm, minority governments are just cases of parties refraining from membership in power and manifestations of their “power shyness”¹⁹, and therefore they are less integrated into classical coalition theories and the distribution of ministerial / governmental portfolios, which work mainly on the example of majority governments (especially coalition majority governments). However, not all cases of minority government cabinets are real examples of compromises between government and political preferences. The point, for example, is that many minority government cabinets are “the borderline” to majority government cabinets, as the government or government parties of such cabinets have 45% or more seats in parliament. In addition, in the case of all types of coalition party governments (i.e. majorities and minorities), small parties are able to blackmail government cabinets on issues related to their parliamentary support, especially if small parties are ideologically influential and may lead to the collapse of some governments and the formation of other ones, which in fact reveals the links between policy-making and patronage.

Accordingly, as J. Blondel points out²⁰, that the only real options for minority governments with the relationship between party support for governments and the simultaneous non-participation of political parties are cases of government cabinets created by a large party, including close to an absolute majority in parliament.

Moreover, such constructions of governments in terms of distribution of positions are often positioned even as rational. After all, according to K. Strøm²¹, electoral costs from

¹⁸ Strøm K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, *Comparative political Studies* 1984, vol. 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.

¹⁹ Strøm K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol. 11, nr. 4, s. 588.

²⁰ Blondel J., *The Links between Appointments, Policy-making and Patronage in Government-supporting Parties Relationships*, *Working Paper* 1995, vol. 101, 31 s.

²¹ Strøm K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol. 11, nr. 4, s. 591.

joining government cabinets are mostly not offset by large power and political benefits. As a result, in the case of such types of governments, we can see almost no distribution of patronage, and political behavior is largely too consensual that even opposition parties are involved in policy-making and decision-making. At the same time, the uniqueness of these cases of government cabinets is due to the fact that the difference between electoral costs and power-political benefits of parties is much differentiated. On the one hand, due to the small parliamentary hierarchy, members of the party elite do not aspire to be government cabinet ministers²².

On the other hand, members of the party-political elite often believe that, as ministers of government cabinets, they will be “persecuted” by parliaments, which will hamper the activities of the government cabinets themselves. In this case, it is a rational position that not members of government cabinets, but members of parliament have more power potential. All these things suggest that the more egalitarian the social and political elite, the less personal aspects of power influence parties’ decisions regarding the participation of their functionaries in government cabinets. In general, this means that situations of parliamentary support for different types of governments without the participation of parties arise in several cases, in particular when: a) support for such governments is provided by small parliamentary parties, especially if they are ideologically different from other non-governmental / opposition parties and therefore cannot form any other government cabinet composition with them; b) parties benefit little from hypothetical participation in government cabinets, as most political decisions are made by consensus, patronage is limited, and the political elite tends to egalitarianism; c) a party or parties that support government cabinets, but are not part of them, feel that they should first and foremost care about their own electoral future.

Instead, there is a distinctive relationship between government cabinets, which have significant autonomy, and parties whose support base is also independent. This is the case for some types of government, both for government cabinets themselves and for the relationship between them and small parties, even whether such parties are governmental or non-governmental, and between government cabinets and major parties. Thus, in this case, the relationship between governments and parties revolves more solely around political benefits rather than political benefits and positions of power. However, this scenario is not typical of parliamentary democracies, as government cabinets (executive) and parliaments (legislatures) do not have different sources of autonomy, but are interconnected. On the other hand, this means that in parliamentary democracies, particularly in those where patronage plays a significant role, parties have a greater initiative in structuring relations between government cabinets and parliaments. Therefore, in this case, there is no need to reach compromises on political issues between government cabinets and parliaments. Although, as noted by K. Strom, even in this case there is a specific type of relationship in the form of compromise between the

²² Strom K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol. 11, nr. 4, s. 592–596.

search for power and the search for influence²³, or in other words, between the dependence of government offices on appointments and their dependence on policy-making²⁴. After all, the appointments in government cabinets of all types are important not only for appointments as such, but also for the purposes pursued as a result, including the protection and promotion of party interests in the future. In addition, the difference between appointments and policy-making in theoretical and analytical contexts helps to explain the cases of different types of governments in parliamentary democracies, especially minority governments, if they occur in a country periodically. In general, this means that in some cases parties have more influence over the formation of government cabinets and government appointments, and in some cases over aspects of policy-making, and this may be cross-cutting for all types of party governments within parliamentary democracies.

As for the principles of government appointments and the allocation of ministerial portfolios, the situation in the case of different types of party governments within parliamentary democracies is typically fully or partially in line with the so-called “Hamson’s law²⁵”, i.e. the rule that coalition / government parties receive government posts in the number, which is close to the proportion of their parliamentary mandates. However, this is often the case for majority coalition governments. Instead, minority governments (both coalition and one-party ones), as H. Beck, M. Debas, and P. note Damont²⁶, reflect scenarios where power / positional benefits / advantages are shared between government cabinet parties (coalition parties), and political benefits / advantages are shared between both government partners and opposition / non-governmental parties. Accordingly, some political forces have certain incentives to become governmental, while other political forces have opposition / non-governmental ones.

Moreover, government political forces in this case are usually able to control the legislative agenda due to the status of the executive branch. However, this instead reduces their political costs of negotiating with opposition / non-governmental parties in the context of supporting the government in promoting their legislative initiatives²⁷. In turn, K. Ström²⁸ argues that the control of the legislative agenda helps the parties that form minority governments to adopt situational strategies of the legislative majority, which are politically the cheapest way to construct a legislative majority (at least compared to formal legislative majority agreements between several parties, including within the coalition government cabinets of the majority) and the most common form of support for some governments, whose parties

²³ Ström K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “*Comparative political Studies*” 1984, vol. 17, nr. 2, s. 211.

²⁴ Blondel J., *The Links between Appointments, Policy-making and Patronage in Government-supporting Parties Relationships*, “*Working Paper*” 1995, vol. 101, 31 s.

²⁵ Gamson W., *A Theory of Coalition Formation*, “*American Sociological Review*” 1961, vol. 26, nr. 3, s. 373–382.

²⁶ Bäck H., Debus M., Dumont P., *Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies*, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2011, vol. 50, nr. 4, s. 441–478.

²⁷ Ström K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

²⁸ Ström K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 110.

have the opportunity to appeal to any non-governmental political forces (even those that did not support them during the formation of governments). Another value of government control over the legislative agenda is often that its incorporation through different types of government cabinets mainly leads to the development of a political position that averages the preferences of governmental and non-governmental parties. As a result, political parties involved in forming governments have an interest in allocating government / ministerial portfolios according to their political preferences. All other things being equal, parties' abandonment of their most anticipated government portfolios in favor of partners should result in greater political costs, especially for majority coalition governments. Instead, political benefits / advantages are potentially achievable in the case of minority governments, especially when all parties have their expected government portfolios. Therefore, it is quite rational in the conditions of minority government cabinets that the government parties are trying to get the portfolios they want in order to increase the chances of realizing the political course they expect. The difference here is that in the case of majority governments, the satisfaction of government parties with ministerial portfolios is less influential in the context of policy-making than in the case of minority governments²⁹.

This logic is in line with the traditional norm for parliamentary democracies, according to which the most important political appointments (regardless of the type of government – majority or minority) are the appointment of members or ministers of the government cabinets³⁰.

The fact is that in the hierarchy of parliamentary democracies (regardless of the forms and systems of government) members of government cabinets play a critical role both individually (in the format of heads of ministries, institutions and departments³¹) and collectively / on a collegiate basis. Moreover, monopoly control of the appointment of members or ministers of various types of government cabinets mainly has political parties and / or the Government offices themselves, which are significantly (because in parliamentary democracies formed mostly party governments) are affected by the party functionaries³². And this despite the fact that compared to the 60-70's of the twentieth century in the early twentieth century the influence of cohesion and mass support of the parties was excessively reduced. This regulates that in parliamentary democracies, non-partisan or non-party appointments to government cabinets are limited. They can, for example, be carried out by heads of state,

²⁹ Bäck H., Debus M., Dumont P., Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies, *European Journal of Political Research* 2011, vol. 50, nr. 4, s. 441–478.

³⁰ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol. 36, s. 619–643.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, The Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg (August 15–17, 2002), 33 s.; Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government: An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave 1996.

³¹ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

³² Strøm K., *Parties at the Core of Government*, [w:] Dalton R., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002.

as many as by presidents in individual republics of the semi-presidential type. Basing on this, K. Strom³³ notes that as of the 50-90's of the twentieth century the average share of non-party ministers in such countries, especially in Europe, was less than 4 percent. Therefore, compared to the same 60s and 70s of the twentieth century, today in parliamentary democracies party cabinets still predominate, but with a smaller number of party functionaries. This means that the practice of appointing non-party ministers to party government cabinets has become more widespread and applied. In this regard, some contemporary scholars, including O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom³⁴, and A. Costa Pinto³⁵, argue that the increase in the share of nonpartisan appointments to ministers and members of all types of government cabinets has been theoretically and empirically observed when: the head of state and the head of government are in a situation of minority (in the case of a parliamentary system of government) or a divided majority (cohabitation) and a divided minority (in the case of a semi-presidential system of government); it is a semi-presidential, not a parliamentary system of government; the legislative prerogatives of the head of state are more extensive; there is an increase in electoral variability and the number of government parties or an increase in party factionalization of legislatures³⁶.

The share of non-party ministers (technocrats) in some government cabinets is also growing for objective reasons, including the growing complexity of governance and the reaction of the political elite and political class in trying to get closer to civil society to economic crises and voter distrust / dissatisfaction. However, even so, in the context of different types of party governments in parliamentary democracies, non-party ministers, due to non-party affiliation and lack of effective legislative experience, are positioned as a minority and play an ephemeral role in the governing process. However, in this context, the fact that the share of non-party ministers and members of government cabinets is higher in the conditions of formation and functioning not of government cabinets of the majority, but of government cabinets of the minority is important. This is due to the fact that when the head of government and the government parties do not control the parliamentary majority, their electoral forecast is theoretically and systematically worse than when the government cabinet (majority) controls the parliamentary majority. As a result, it is clear that in such a situation, the negotiating influence of heads of government should deteriorate, especially in systems where, according to the rules of government formation, heads of state have

³³ Strom K., *Parties at the Core of Government*, [w:] Dalton R., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207.

³⁴ Amorim Neto O., Strom K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol. 36, s. 619–643.; Amorim Neto O., Strom K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, The Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg (August 15–17, 2002), 33 s.

³⁵ Costa Pinto A., *Expert and Non-partisan Ministers Contemporary Democracies: European and Latin American Perspectives*, Wyd. University of Lisbon.

³⁶ Amorim Neto O., Samuels D., Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective, *Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies* 2010, vol. 1, nr. 1, s. 10–23.

a significant influence³⁷. Empirically, this means that the share of non-partisan ministers in the formation of different types of governments is greater in semi-presidential rather than parliamentary systems, which is the case for all regions of Europe³⁸. After all, when in the semi-presidential republics the negotiating potential of parliaments is hampered by their significant fragmentation, the influence of presidents increases and instead the influence of parties in relation to the control of government appointments decreases³⁹. Empirical evidence of this is the fact that most non-partisan governments (both permanent and temporary) and non-partisan ministers are formed and appointed in semi-presidential and even parliamentary systems of government with influential heads of state⁴⁰.

In the context of the distribution of ministerial / government portfolios in minority government cabinets, the phenomenon of concentration of power, which is usually incorporated through processes of weakening the collectiveness of government cabinets and strengthening the roles of prime ministers, also plays a key role. The key reasons for such processes are typically appeals to the figures of state leaders⁴¹, as well as to the tendencies of excessive fragmentation of party systems and the public sector⁴², mediatization and internationalization of politics⁴³. This fits into the already traditional tendency for parliamentary democracies to limit the collegial nature of government decisions, and instead – in the centralization of influence around the head of the executive branch⁴⁴. Nevertheless, in this context, we can still see a significant difference between the government cabinets of the majority and the government cabinets of the minority. The fact is that majority governments are determined by more influential prime ministers than minority governments, so the cabinets they lead have more institutional capacity to dominate domestic politics than minority cabinets⁴⁵. The latter, in turn, are forced to seek the support of other / non-governmental parties in order to implement the measures proposed and planned by their prime ministers or cabinets in general. In contrast, majority governments may lose parliamentary votes if party discipline is violated, and the executive

³⁷ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Siaroff A., Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-presidential and Parliamentary Distinction, *European Journal of Political Research* 2003, vol. 43, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

³⁸ Costa Pinto A., *Expert and Non-partisan Ministers Contemporary Democracies: European and Latin American Perspectives*, Wyd. University of Lisbon.; Protsyk O., Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-presidentialism, *Political Studies* 2006, vol. 54, nr. 2, s. 219–244.

³⁹ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets, *American Political Science Review* 2009, vol. 103, nr. 3, s. 496–512.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Democracies Compared, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol. 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

⁴⁰ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol. 36, s. 619–643.

⁴¹ Karvonen L., *The Personalisation of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2010.; Helms L., The Presidentialisation of Political Leadership: British Notions and German Observations, *The Political Quarterly* 2005, vol. 75, nr. 3, s. 430–438.

⁴² Peters G., Rhodes R., Wright V., *Administering the Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries*, Basingstoke 2000.

⁴³ Johansson K., Tallberg J., Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change, *West European Politics* 2010, vol. 33, nr. 2, s. 208–236.

⁴⁴ Peters G., Rhodes R., Wright V., *Administering the Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries*, Basingstoke 2000.

⁴⁵ Johansson K., Tallberg J., Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change, *West European Politics* 2010, vol. 33, nr. 2, s. 211.

and legislative vectors of party activities focus on different preferences / preferences⁴⁶. But this is against the background of the remark that political differences should traditionally be smaller within parties rather than between parties, making it easier for majority government cabinets than for minority government cabinets to make proposals through parliaments. This strengthens the potential of parties and individual party functionaries precisely in the context of majority governments in the context of their ability to dominate domestic politics and leads to the elevation of individual officials, primarily prime ministers, from among other members of government cabinets. Accordingly, the decisions of majority governments are more meaningful and more specific than the decisions of minority governments, but the decision-making process is potentially more conflicting in the context of majority governments as well.

At the same time, the specificity of the concentration of power in minority governments is determined by the countries in which and how often these structures are formed. If minority governments are formed as deviant and exceptional scenarios, then the concentration of power in them may resemble the identical case of majority governments. However, if minority government cabinets are formed permanently, then their inter-institutional conditionality is different, which often leads to a strengthening of the patterns of collegiality and consensus and a weakening of the positions of prime ministers⁴⁷. By this logic, it is clear that in the case of minority governments, the role of the cabinet phenomenon (the set of chief government ministers) decreases, while the role of the government cabinet phenomenon (the set of all ministers and key government officials) increases. In general, this confirms the scientific position that the peculiarities of the composition and structuring of government cabinets of all types affect the parameters and specifics of the concentration and collegiality of power in them. Although, by a reversal of, the nature of the collegiality of government cabinets is dynamic and different in different countries, but in general the rule works that the more people who influence decision-making in governments, the less concentration of government power in prime ministers and more the collegial nature of the decisions of such government cabinets. In contrast, the in formalization of key government decision-making procedures in all types of government – both majority and minority – has led to an increase in the concentration of government power among prime ministers in government cabinets. This is especially true for consensus models of government, because they have a noticeable shift in the direction from the previously traditional consensus-collegial culture of governmental and managerial decisions to the phenomenon of “structural presidentialization” of government and political process.

By a reversal of, it is absolutely obvious that the level of concentration of government power by prime ministers can affect the frequency of different types of government. For example, if the prime minister and his political party have exclusive powers that significantly strengthen

⁴⁶ Laver M., Divided Parties, Divided Government, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1999, vol. 24, nr. 1, s. 7.

⁴⁷ King A., *Chief Executives in Western Europe*, [w:] Budge I., McKay D.(eds.), *Developing Democracy: Comparative research in honour of J.F.P. Blondel*, Wyd. Sage 1994.; O'Malley E., The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey, *“International Political Science Review”* 2007, vol. 28, nr. 1, s. 7–27.

their power-administrative capacity compared to other governmental and non-governmental parties, participation in the government cabinet becomes less attractive – both institutionally (at the party level) and individually (at the level of individual ministers), as a result of which the probability of forming not majority governments but minority governments increases.

This is in line with the theoretical and methodological remarks of P. Mitchell and B. Newbled, according to which: the more the rules of institutional design favor the Prime Minister's party over other hypothetical coalition partners, the less attractive it becomes to become a junior coalition partner. At the same time, J. Blondel argues that the connection between the power of the prime ministers and the types of government cabinets is not significant, but only additional⁴⁸.

After all, in addition to the concentration of power in the head of government and the nature of the power-management process, the political structuring of the government is also influenced by other factors. Among them, the factors of positioning the powers, roles and responsibilities of ministers, deputy ministers and civil servants in parliamentary democracies are quite important. In this regard, J. Bourgeois⁴⁹ notes that the relationship between ministers and their deputies, as well as civil servants of minority governments, for example, is much more complex in matters of mutual trust than identical relations in the case of instead of majority governments. The fact is that in the case of minority governments, there is an almost permanent trend of developing public policy more urgently and in order to address more short-term issues, resulting in greater importance in terms of accountability of members of government to public opinion and more centralized control over governments. This, according to G. Marchildon⁵⁰, is due to the fact that internally, the cabinets of the minority are defined by a lower level of compromises than the cabinets of the majority, so they may be less stable than the governments of the majority. However, because minority government cabinets are very sensitive to public opinion and unsure of the duration of their operations, their ministers try to avoid risky public policy decisions and focus on making the most progressive / effective decisions within available resources. As a result, the rule is that policy and program planning for minority governments is less defined than for majority governments. The main reason is that minority governments are not able to be sure what changes and amendments will be made to their proposed bills and whether their bills will eventually become laws. In addition, it should be noted that majority governments are characterized by greater party discipline than minority governments, which makes it relatively easier to bid on the bills initiated by them. As a result, minority government cabinet ministers are subject to political pressure and are constantly monitored, at least to a greater extent than in the case of majority governments⁵¹.

⁴⁸ Blondel J., Müller-Rommel F., Malova D., *Governing New European Democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave 2006, s. 186.

⁴⁹ Bourgault J., *Minority government and senior government officials: the case of the Canadian federal government*, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 2011, vol. 49, nr. 4, s. 510–527.

⁵⁰ Marchildon G., *Coalition government and collective responsibility*, *Public Sector Magazine* 2010, vol. 21, nr. 3, s. 14.

⁵¹ Indridason I., Kam C., *Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift*, *British Journal of Political Science* 2008, vol. 38, nr. 4, s. 621–656.

This means, in other words, that control over minority government ministers is more centralized than in the case of majority governments. Accordingly, ministers are less flexible in the case of minority governments than majority governments. However, according to J. Hodgson, in the case of a minority government capable of working in a “rational security”⁵² environment, the officials of such a government can be as influential as the officials in the majority government.

However, in this context, it is noteworthy that in the case of minority governments, the primary or general purpose of the civil service does not change from that of the majority government, as it is engaged in implementing government programs, its own direct responsibilities, and influencing government agendas. The outlined areas of employment of civil servants cover two parts: first – the provision of professional and non-party-oriented advice and counseling to cabinet ministers; second, the loyal and effective implementation of government cabinet policies and programs as soon as they have been agreed by the prime minister, ministers, ministries, and departments. So, in the case of majority governments, in the case of minority governments, the civil service must be politically sensitive, albeit apolitical (non-partisan). At the same time, the logic of the civil service from the perspective of minority government offices is modified by the fact that it is on average less predictable than in the case of majority governments, and therefore officials must be constantly interested in voter sentiment and public opinion.

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⁵² Hodgson J., The Impact of Minority Government on the Senior Civil Servant, *“Canadian Public Administration”* 1976, vol. 19, nr. 2, s. 237.

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